Abstract. The paper studies modal logics of Kripke frames, in which possible worlds are regions in space with natural accessibility relations.
Introduction
The subject of this paper is between three different themes: temporal logic of relativity, interval temporal logic, and spatial modal logic. Originally these themes were independent, but nowadays there is growing influence between them. A detailed historical overview of all related work might be an interesting, but rather difficult task. So let us give only some introductory remarks and references.
Relativistic temporal logic was first mentioned in Prior's [22] and first axiomatized in [12] . Not so much has been known in this field so far, in comparison to the first-order approach to special and general relativity (for the latter, see e.g. [2] and references therein).
The idea of interval semantics ("a possible world is a time-interval") is traced back to Jean Buridan (14th century), cf. [21] . In a modern setting this idea first appeared in linguistic semantics (e.g. [3] ), next in temporal logic [16] , [23] , [20] and finally in Computer Science logic [15] ; see [29] , [13] for further references. A simple observation that intervals on the line correspond to points on the half-plane, puts interval logics into the context of two-dimensional modal logics [30] , [18] .
Basic relations between intervals on the line were identified in [1] : "before", "meets", "overlaps" etc. One can consider modal operators corresponding to these relations, but modal logics involving them all happen to be undecidable [15] . If only some of these modalities are used, a logic may be still decidable. In general, the landscape of interval logics remains yet unclear.
The third kind of logics considered in this paper are modal logics of regions in space. The idea that a region can be a better basic notion in axiomatic geometry than a point, is rather old [8] , [31] ; an essential work has been done in first-order "pointless" theories of space, cf. [14] , [11] . This approach is widely used in Qualitative Spatial Reasoning [7] . Now modal logics are also applied to this field, but mainly in topological setting (cf. [4] ; [9] , Ch. 16). Quite recently a simple analogy between regions and intervals led to "modal logics of regions" [17] , which are discussed below as well.
Informally the main unifying idea of this paper is that points in (n + 1)-spacetime correspond to regions in n-space via cones; so intervals as onedimensional regions correspond to points in Minkowski 2-space.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 contains very standard material and notations. Section 3 gives an outline of completeness results in relativistic modal logic. Section 4 shows how these results can be interpreted for logics of balls and intervals, and Section 5 considers modal logics of other regions. In Section 6 we discuss properties of the modality "after" in Minkowski spacetime; exact axiomatizations are still unknown in this case. Section 7 shows that in this area some natural modal logics may be not finitely axiomatizable. In Section 8 we quote some earlier results on complexity and finite model property. Section 9 discusses some results on intuitionistic logic and its extensions, and Section 10 puts questions for further study.
Preliminaries
Let us begin with some set-theoretic and geometric notation.
For a set V ⊆ R n , IV denotes its interior, CV denotes its closure.
Points in R n are denoted by X, Y, Z, X 1 . . .
We use different projections
s(X) := (x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ); t(X) := pr n (X).
Also let
is the closed r-neighbourhood of U ⊆ R n ; B(X, r) := B({X}, r) is the closed ball with center X of radius r.
P V = {p 1 , p 2 , . . . } denotes the countable set of propositional variables;
as usual, modal formulas are built from P V , classical connectives, and modal (unary) connectives. n-formulas are built using only variables from the set P V n := {p 1 , . . . , p n }.
In this paper we consider normal modal propositional logics (as sets of formulas). For a modal logic Λ and a modal formula A, the notation Λ A means A ∈ Λ; Λ + A denotes the smallest modal logic containing Λ ∪ {A}.
Λ n denotes the set of all n-formulas in a modal logic Λ.
Recall that a (Kripke) frame is a pair (W, R), where W is a non-empty set, R is a binary relation on W . The notation x ∈ F means x ∈ W .
A (Kripke) model is a Kripke frame with a valuation: M = (W, R, θ),
The sign denotes the truth at a point of a Kripke model and also the validity in a Kripke frame. L(F ) denotes the set of all formulas
The notation f : F 1 F 2 means that f is a p-morphism from F 1 onto
As usual, for a relation R we denote R(x) := {y | xRy}. R denotes the transitive closure of R; Id W denotes the equality relation on W . We also
A frame F = (W, R) (and the relation R) is called pretransitive if for
Let us recall some first-order properties of a relation R: seriality ∀x∃y xRy;
McKinsey property ∀x∃y ∈ R(x) R(y) = {y};
irreflexive McKinsey ∀x(R(x) = ∅ → ∃y ∈ R(x) R(y) = ∅); property density ∀x∀y∃z(xRy → xRz ∧ zRy);
2-density ∀x∀y 1 ∀y 2 ∃z(xRy 1 ∧ xRy 2 → xRz ∧ zRy 1 ∧ zRy 2 );
confluence, or ∀x∀y 1 ∀y 2 ∃z(xRy 1 ∧ xRy 2 → y 1 Rz ∧ y 2 Rz).
Church -Rosser property
Some modal axioms and the corresponding properties of frames:
McKinsey property (for transitive frames),
We use specific notation for some modal logics:
For a logic Λ let Λ.1 := Λ + A1, Λ.2 := Λ + A2.
Causal and chronological modalities in

Minkowski spacetime
It is well-known that relativistic time is branching, due to the finiteness of the speed of light. An event (a point in a spacetime) X is earlier than an event Y if a signal can be sent from X to Y . So future events may be incomparable if they are too distant in space. Bimodal temporal logics of these branching structures are still unknown, but there are some results on monomodal logics.
Recall that Minkowski metrics in R n , n ≥ 2 is obtained from the following quadratic form:
Chronological accessibility ≺ and causal accessibility in Minkowski spacetime are defined as follows:
In the simplest cases modal logics of frames with these accessibility relations are already known. Apparently Theorem 4 can be extended to the same type of domains as in Theorem 3, and similar results can be proved for higher dimensions.
For frames F = (CU, ≺), where U ⊂ R 2 is an open domain with a smooth boundary, the situation is more delicate. In [25] it is proved that
But 2-density does not always hold for frames of this kind, e.g.
for the frame on Figure 1a .
Nevertheless for convex domains we have:
On the other hand, note that the frame on Figure 1b is not convex, but 2-dense, so its logic still equals CI.
The above results imply the following Lemma 6. For n ≥ 2 we have:
Logics of polygons on Minkowski plane are also studied in [27] , [26] , [25] .
In particular, the following holds.
Theorem 7.
For a convex open polygon X ⊂ R 2 there may be two options:
Let us also mention the correlation between product logics [10] , [9] and relativistic logics. Consider the product frame
where
Relativistic time can be interpreted within this frame. In fact, the frames (R 2 , < 1 • < 2 ) and (R 2 , ≺) are isomorphic (by rotation). So the logic
where ϕ translates as 1 2 and does not affect other connectives.
Note that the whole bimodal logic L((R, <) 2 ) is Π 1 1 -complete, and therefore not recursively axiomatizable [9] .
Similarly we have 
Balls and intervals
In this Section we interpret the previous results in terms of balls. This can be done due to a natural correspondence between points in Minkowski (n + 1)-half-space and n-balls.
There is a standard bijection Ψ : 2a) . The other way round, for b = B(X, r) ∈ B * n , we have
Definition 10. For a relation R on B * n , its lower-correspondent is the relation S on R n+1 − such that Ψ is an isomorphism between (B * n , R) and
Proof. In fact, for balls b 1 = B(X 1 , r 1 ), b 2 = B(X 2 , r 2 ) we have (Fig. 2b) Table 1 . For the case n = 1, B 1 = I, B * 1 = I * are the sets of all strict and non-strict closed intervals on the real line:
So Theorem 12 also describes logics of intervals with strict and non-strict subinterval relations:
Regions and bricks in R n
There are different options for spatial analogues of intervals; the corresponding modal logics are often undecidable (see Section 8 below). But in the simplest cases we obtain the same modal logics as in the previous Section.
Recall that a closed set V is called regular if CIV = V . Let CN n (respectively, CV n ) be the set of all non-empty compact regular sets with the connected (respectively, convex) interior in R n , and let CN * n (CV * n ) be its extension by all singletons. Sets of all these types are called regions.
n-dimensional bricks are a special type of regions:
Trivially,
Theorem 13. Table 2 contains completeness results for some logics of regions and bricks, n ≥ 1. (I, ) is 2-dense, for some v 1 , . . . , v n we have:
v i , we obtain: r s r ; s r . Therefore (R n , ) Ad 2 .
Since (R * n , ) contains singletons, which are dead ends, it follows that ) and B(v, r) ∈ CN n , it follows that
Similarly one can prove the 2-density of for CN n and CV n . ily see that d(V ) ∈ I whenever V ∈ CN n and moreover, for any W ∈ {CN n , CV n , R n }, R ∈ { , ⊇, , ⊆},
Hence by Theorem 12, we obtain completeness.
Remarks on "After"
Monomodal logics based on the relations ⊆, and their spacetime analogues ≺, , do not allow us either to determine the dimension of space, or to distinguish balls from bricks. But R. Goldblatt noticed that the modality "after" might be more expressive. It corresponds to relation α, the simplest irreflexive version of , i.e. for X, Y ∈ R n , n ≥ 2,
It is easy to see that α is transitive, dense, serial, and confluent, but not 2-dense. (To disprove the 2-density for (R 2 , α), take the points (0, 0), (−1, 1), (1, 1).) But some subtler modally definable properties still hold for α.
First consider the formulas
(as usual, we assume that
. These are Sahlqvist formulas; the first-order correspondent of Ad n,2 is
Lemma 14.
(1) K + Ad n,2 Ad n+1,2 , (2) K + Ad n,2 Ad 1 .
Proof. (1) is almost obvious. To show (2), substitute p for every p i in
Ad n,2 .
Lemma 15. [12]
(1) (R 2 , α) Ad 3,2 .
(2) (R 3 , α) Ad n,2 for any n. (2) Take different points X 1 , . . . , X n on the circle
Every X i is seen from O = (0, 0, 0) (Fig. 3b) , but O is the maximal point seeing two distinct X i s. Thus Ad n,2 fails.
Now let us consider another extra axiom
and let
This axiom corresponds to the following first-order condition:
Proposition 16.
( Similarly we obtain Proposition 17. Proof.
(
by Proposition 16, we obtain (1).
(2) Let us show that (R n , ⊂) Ad 2n+1,2 . Consider bricks r, r 1 , . . . , r 2n+1 such that r ⊂ r i for any i, and assume that r = 
and for any i there exists j i such that v j i ⊂ v ij i . By pigeonhole principle, at least three of these numbers j i coincide. So for some j and for some
On the other hand, a straightforward argument shows that (R n , ⊂) Ad 2n,2 , so by Lemma 14, (R n , ⊂) Ad l,2 for any l ≤ 2n. Thus m < n implies (R n , ⊂) Ad 2m+1,2 , while (R m , ⊂) Ad 2m+1,2 . However we do not know exact axiomatizations for logics of frames considered in this Section; the problem of their decidability is also open.
Non-finitely axiomatizable logics
It seems that in many cases relativistic modal logics are not finitely axiomatizable; some examples are presented in this Section. Our arguments are based on the following simple fact.
Lemma 18. Consider a logic Λ and suppose that for every n there exist
is not finitely axiomatizable, and moreover, not axiomatizable by any set of n-formulas with n fixed.
Proof. Almost trivial. Consider a set Γ ⊂ Λ n. Then G n Γ, and
For every finite rooted pretransitive frame F one can construct an analogue of Jankov-Fine frame formula X(F ) (cf. [5] ), with the following property:
Lemma 19. Let F be a finite pretransitive rooted frame, G an arbitrary Fig. 5) : So K m is an "irreflexive m-clique".
Now let us define frames
Lemma 20.
Proof. For worlds u, v in a certain Kripke model M , we write
It is clear that the equivalence relation ≡ 0 has at most 2 n classes.
(1) Consider an arbitrary model M over K 2 n +1 . Then for some distinct a, b ∈ M we have: a ≡ 0 b. By symmetry, we may assume that a = w 2 n , b = w 2 n +1 . Now we merge these points into a single reflexive point, and obtain a model M over the frame K 2 n .
By induction on the length of an n-formula A it follows that (Fig. 6 ).
By induction we obtain that for any n-formula A, for any i < m
Hence the claim follows.
Now consider the relations ≺ ± and . Note that for distinct
finitely axiomatizable (and not axiomatizable in finitely many variables).
Proof.
(I) Let R ∈ { , ≺ }. It is sufficient to show that for any l, X ∈ R n (1) (R n , R) To prove (1), let us take distinct parallel straight lines Q 1 , . . . , Q l−1 of timelike direction, and let us define a map f : R n −→ K l as follows:
Then f : (R n , R) K l for R ∈ { , ≺ }. In fact, every line Q i contains points that are -related to X, whenever X ∈ Q i .
For the proof of (2), note that the (R n , ) contains arbitrarily large antichains (containing the given X). Thus (R n , R) X contains a subframe isomorphic to K l+1 , which cannot be mapped monotonically onto K l .
(II) Now let R ∈ { ± , ≺ ± , }. Again by Lemma 20 , it is sufficient to show
To check (1), we take different hyperplanes P 1 , . . . , P l−1 parallel to R n 0 : P i = {X ∈ R n | t(X) = i}. Let us split each P i into two dense subsets, P i and
we put:
It follows that g : (R n , R) L l ; in fact, if X ∈ P i , then the geometric cone ≺ ± (X) intersects P i and P i .
To prove (2), note that the frame (R n , ≺) is directed, and thus for any X 1 , . . . , X k there exists Y such that X 1 RY, . . . , X k RY . This property trans-
related to all other points, which is a contradiction.
Similarly one can prove the following Theorem 22. For any n ≥ 1,
the logic L(W, R) is not finitely axiomatizable.
Finite Model Property and Complexity
The logics S4, S4.1, S4.2 are well-known; they all have the finite model property (FMP) and are PSPACE-complete, cf. [6] , [5] , [24] .
The FMP for the logics OI, OI.2 is proved in [26] ; a similar method is used for CI in [25] .
The complexity of 2-dense logics was first studied in [24] , where the proof of PSPACE-completeness for OI, OI.2 was given. A slight modification of this proof yields the PSPACE-completeness for CI.
Therefore the simplest regional, interval and spacetime logics enjoy the FMP and are PSPACE-complete. But more expressive systems turn out to be undecidable [15] , [17] . Let us recall some of these results and give their analogues for relativistic logics.
Recall that RCC5-relations between regions are {=, ⊂, ⊃, , },
Consider spacetime correspondents of , ; viz. for X 1 , X 2 ∈ R n+1 − we put:
One can see that
In [17] it proved that every logic L(R n , ⊂, ⊃, , ) is undecidable. Since 
Remarks on intuitionistic logic
It is well-known that every intuitionistic formula A can be transformed into So we have the following consequence from Sections 3, 4, 5.
Corollary 25.
(1) IL(R n , ) = KC for any n ≥ 2. (4) For W ∈ {B n , R n , CN n , CV n , B * n , R * n , CN * n , CV * n } we have IL(W, ⊇) = H, IL(W, ⊆) = KC.
The frames mentioned in (4) also admit interpretation using Medvedev's notion of "information types" [19] . Let us briefly describe it in an equivalent Kripke-style form.
A region can be regarded as "information" about some unknown point in this region (in particular, an interval gives information about a real number).
The inclusion u ⊆ v means that information u "refines" v. The truth value of an intuitionistic proposition depends on the information we have; u A Proposition 26. For W ∈ {B n , R n , CN n , CV n , B * n , R * n , CN * n , CV * n } we have (W, ⊇) A iff H A.
In [19] validity is defined in terms of "information types", which is equivalent to taking the Heyting algebra of the corresponding Kripke frame. The frame in [19] is different: "informations" are arbitrary non-empty sets of natural numbers. Then the intuitionistic logic is incomplete, and the corresponding set of valid formulas seems to be rather complex (recursively enumerable, but still unknown). Some related logics are studied in [28] ; they also do not look simple. However the above proposition shows that in principle, Medvedev's idea is correct: completeness theorem holds if information is treated as a region of a certain kind (or a cone, in the relativistic approach). so A is true if A is true at some "distant place".
